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Abstract
Malware detection and remediation is an on-going task for
computer security and IT professionals. It is needed to en-
sure the integrity of systems that process sensitive informa-
tion and control many aspects of everyday life. We examine
the use of machine learning algorithms to detect malware
using the system calls generated by executables—alleviating
attempts at obfuscation as the behavior is monitored rather
than the bytes of an executable. We examine several ma-
chine learning techniques for detecting malware including
random forests, deep learning techniques, and liquid state
machines. The experiments examine the effects of concept
drift on each algorithm to understand how well the algo-
rithms generalize to novel malware samples by testing them
on data that was collected after the training data. The re-
sults suggest that each of the examined machine learning
algorithms is a viable solution to detect malware—achieving
between 90% and 95% class-averaged accuracy (CAA). In
real-world scenarios, the performance evaluation on an op-
erational network may not match the performance achieved
in training. Namely, the CAA may be about the same,
but the values for precision and recall over the malware can
change significantly. We structure experiments to highlight
these caveats and offer insights into expected performance in
operational environments. In addition, we use the induced
models to gain a better understanding about what differen-
tiates the malware samples from the goodware, which can
further be used as a forensics tool to understand what the
malware (or goodware) was doing to provide directions for
investigation and remediation.
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1 Introduction
Identifying malicious software (malware) on a host ma-
chine is a critical task in maintaining a system’s in-
tegrity and the integrity of the work performed on that
system. Intrusion detection systems (IDSs)—such as
anti-virus software—are used to identify, assess, and re-
port any unauthorized programs on a system. Malware
authors use various techniques to evade detection by an
IDS such as changing which registers are used, chang-
ing machine instructions to equivalent ones, reorder-
ing independent instruction blocks, and inserting no-
operation instructions [23]. Signature-based approaches
used by many IDSs are static and unable to adapt to
the dynamic approaches implemented in malware, other
than by repeatedly adding new signatures manually.
As the number of computing devices increases, espe-
cially those used to process sensitive tasks (e.g., bank-
ing, health care, and infrastructure), it is imperative to
detect compromised systems as soon as possible.
Despite exploiting different vulnerabilities and em-
ploying obfuscation techniques, most malware exhibits
common behavior. For example, once a system is ex-
ploited, malware will often beacon out to a command
and control server or clean up log files to cover its tracks
or another such activity as depicted in the cyber kill
chain for advanced persistent threats [8]. In addition to
the behavioral extent of malware, it is also important to
consider the implications of concept drift wherein a tar-
get distribution (in this case, the behavior of malware)
is non-stationary and changes over time.
We examine machine learning (ML) algorithms
(random forests (RFs), deep learning approaches and
liquid state machines (LSMs)) to detect malicious be-
havior using system call traces (calls to functions pro-
vided by the operating system—see Figure 1). We ex-
amine these methods using a concept drift scenario,
whereby training data precedes test data collected from
a corporate gateway. We observe that these algorithms
are able to distinguish between malware and goodware
with an average class-averaged accuracy (CAA) of 93%
with a malware precision of 93% and 88% recall.
ML for identifying malware has several unique
challenges. Explicitly, malware authors actively try to
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Figure 1: Process for generating the system call data.
a) System calls are functions called from an executable
to the underlying operating system. b) The system calls
are intercepted and saved in a file and then converted to
a multi-hot encoding (MHE) of the system call traces.
masquerade their malware as goodware. There is also
a scaling issue in the sheer amount of data samples,
the size of each data sample, and class imbalance. In
operational networks of large corporations, there will
be large amounts of executables observed across the
network with less than 1% of them being malware. We
structure experiments to investigate these issues and
offer insights from traditional training schemes.
An induced model captures the generalizations of
the underlying data that it is modeling. We explore the
use of ML explainability techniques to understand the
characteristics of malware and identify behaviors that
lead to its classification as malware.
Our contributions include: 1) a comparison of sev-
eral ML models in malware identification using system
call traces on real-world data, 2) an analysis of mal-
ware including which features are the most important
for identifying malware, and 3) practical insights in how
to apply these results in real-world scenarios and the im-
plications of using each technique.
2 Related Work
Several previous studies have shown promising results
using ML algorithms to detect malware [16] or to dif-
ferentiate between different families of malware [9].
There are two common approaches to extract features
from malware: static analysis and dynamic analysis [6].
Static analysis refers to extracting statistics from the
meta-information of an executable without running the
executable, such as a list of DLLs in the binary [19]
or byte n-grams [10]. Features from static analysis are
vulnerable to obfuscation techniques such as code trans-
formation techniques, but have the advantage that mal-
ware never has to be executed. Feeding these features
into various ML algorithms produced good results show-
ing the benefits of using ML to detect malware. De-
spite this success, Kruegel et al. showed that advanced,
semantic-based malware detectors can be evaded using
obfuscation techniques commonly employed by malware
authors. They concluded that static analysis techniques
alone are not sufficient to identify malware [11].
Dynamic analysis, on the other hand, runs an exe-
cutable to extract features. Dynamic analysis, in prin-
ciple, should be less vulnerable to obfuscation as it
extracts features from the behavior of an executable.
Several previous works used Markov chains to model
system call sequences. Ravi and Manoharan use third-
order Markov chains to model the system call traces and
achieve better detection rates than support vector ma-
chines, decision trees, and na¨ıve Bayes [17]. Anderson
et al. extract Markov chains of the instruction traces as
features. Graph kernels are then used to create a sim-
ilarity matrix which is then passed to a support vector
machine for classification [3].
The success of neural networks in other application
areas has motivated the use of neural methods to
classify malware. For example, Nataraj et al. treat
executables as gray-scale images and use well proven
image processing techniques to classify malware [14].
Tobiyama et al. use long short-term memory neurons
to learn a language model of the malware based on
their system calls using unsupervised learning [22]. The
output from this learned language model is then fed
into a convolutional neural network for classification.
These works report accuracies of 96-98%; however they
only experimented using cross-validation, discarding
any temporal ordering and not validating how the
models handle concept drift. Our work builds on the
success of the previous works, provides a comparison
of several methods, and examines how the investigated
methods handle concept drift.
3 System Call Data
System calls are the standardized programmatic path-
ways that allow programs to interact with the operat-
ing system. Programs use system calls to request and
manipulate computer resources controlled by the oper-
ating system, such as files, memory and network con-
nections. The data used for this analysis is a sequence
of system calls made to the operating system from an
given executable Figure 1 a shows this process. The ex-
ecutables were gathered from two sources. The benign
executables were pulled from the gateway of a corpo-
rate network under the assumption that the majority of
the downloaded executables are benign. These executa-
bles were run through several anti-virus programs and,
if none hit, then the sample was considered benign. Of
course, it is possible that there are malware samples in
the collected executables with some probability. This
is consistent with real world situations where labels are
not precise nor available for all samples. The malware
samples were gathered from daily feeds from Arbor Net-
works, a cybersecurity company that maintains a repos-
itory of malware.
The data was collected over the course of 2012. All
samples are Windows 32-bit executables. Each sample
was executed in a hypervisor environment (a platform
for running virtual machines) for a given period of time
and the system calls made by the top-level process were
collected. In total, 14,483 samples were collected from
6,197 benign executables and 8,286 malware samples.
In our analysis, we only analyzed the original, primary
process, ignoring any spawned processes. Future work
will include an analysis of the spawned processes in
addition to the parameters that are passed to the system
calls.
Generally, complexity for the sequence learning
methods increases with the length of the system call
trace. We limit our analysis to look at the first n system
calls made by an executable. Most analyses are done on
the first 1000 system calls. An analysis of the length of
the system call traces is provided in Section 6.1.
As multiple system calls can occur in a time step
(the granularity of each time step is one millisecond),
we use a multi-hot encoding scheme as depicted in
Figure 1b. In multi-hot encoding, a vector the length
of the number of unique system calls is initialized with
all zeros. The number of times each system call made
during a time step is put into the vector at the index
representing the given system call. With this base data
set, we allow each algorithm to further process the data
to highlight its strengths.
4 Learning Algorithms
4.1 Histograms and Random Forests
(Hist+RF) One way to encode the time series
data for learning is to use histograms. Each feature
represents a particular system call and the value
corresponds to the number of times that call was made
for a given system call trace. With this encoding,
any supervised ML algorithm can be applied to the
resulting dataset. We use this encoding as input to a
random forest (RF) [4].
This encoding does not capture the temporal
information—the order in which system calls were
made—of the data. It can be modified to encode some
ordering by using of n-grams, where each feature be-
comes a unique sequence of n system calls present in
the data. However, the n-gram encoding increases both
the dimensionality and the sparseness of the data as n is
increased, which can make learning more difficult. We
do not examine the use of n-grams here.
4.2 Deep Learning Methods Deep neural net-
works have been shown to be effective for pattern recog-
nition in images, speech, and text. We examine the
use of convolutional neural networks (CNNs) and long
short-term memory (LSTM) recurrent neural networks
(RNNs). CNNs are essential elements of state-of-the-art
systems for classifying objects in images and LSTMs are
used in state-of-the-art text/natural language process-
ing applications. CNNs and LSTMs are used together
in state-of-the-art speech recognition systems to capture
the sequence of spectral patterns over time from speech
data [2]. We examine the effectiveness of CNNs, LSTMs
and a combination of the two for detecting malware from
system call traces.
4.2.1 Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN)
A convolutional layer in a deep neural network learns
patterns of local structure in the input signal. Sub-
sequent convolutional layers learn combinations of fea-
tures detected in previous layers. Thus, the CNNs can
learn feature representations over a sequence of input
data [12]. The final layer of the CNN classifies an input
sequence as goodware or malware as a function of the
high-level system call structure detected over the entire
sequence. The system calls are translated into integer
values in a one-dimensional vector and are then pro-
cessed by a CNN with one-dimensional convolutional
layers.
We tested three different architectures with a vari-
ety of kernel sizes. Each architecture ran for 60 epochs
with kernels of five, seven, and ten elements. All net-
works used categorical cross entropy as the loss function
and used 32, 64, or 128 filters. We used 1) a CNN with
two, one-dimensional convolutional layers followed by
pooling, dropout, and dense layers, 2) a pure CNN with
five convolutional layers, and 3) a hybrid CNN with five
convolutional layers separated by batch normalization
layers. From empirical analyses, the hybrid convolu-
tional network had the best performance and fastest
training. Only the results from the hybrid model are
reported.
4.2.2 Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) For
the LSTM [7], each system call trace includes a time-
ordered sequence of system call IDs on which an LSTM
network can detect temporal (sequence) patterns that
are important for discriminating between goodware and
malware. One and two layers of LSTM neurons with
various numbers of neurons per layer were explored.
Each node learns a different sequence pattern and the
collection of sequence pattern detectors from all the
nodes connected to the output layer are used to classify
each system call log.
4.2.3 Combined Convolutional and Recurrent
Neural Network (CNN+LSTM) Combining layers
of a CNN with LSTM layer(s) has been shown to be
a powerful classifier that learns temporal patterns in
sequences of local structure. Convolutional layers can
present a sequence of higher-level features to an LSTM
layer, which often leads to superior performance than
an LSTM presented with raw sequence data. Thus, we
examine using a convolutional layer before feeding the
input into 1 or 2 LSTM layers.
4.3 Liquid State Machines (LSM) The LSM [13]
is a neural-inspired algorithm that mimics the cortical
columns in the brain. LSMs are composed of three gen-
eral components: 1) input neurons, 2) randomly con-
nected leaky integrate-and-fire spiking neurons (LIF)
called the liquid, and 3) readout nodes that read the
state of liquid. The liquid functions as a temporal ker-
nel, casting the input data into a higher dimension and
the LIF neurons allow for temporal state to be carried
from one time step to another. We use a liquid of 135
neurons where the inputs are randomly connected to
30% of the neurons in the liquid.
The readout neurons are the only neurons that have
plastic synapses, allowing for synaptic weight updates
via training. Any classifier can be used, but often a
linear classifier is sufficient. We use a support vector
machine with a radial basis function kernel to train
the readout neurons. The sigma and box parameters
for the kernel are chosen using Bayesian optimization
minimizing the 10-fold cross validation loss.
One benefit of using a liquid state machine is that
it can be run on neuromorphic hardware, which will
significantly reduce the computational time and power
consumption [20].
5 Experimental Methodology
To evaluate each algorithm described in Section 4, we
report the accuracy (Acc), the class averaged accuracy
(CAA), and, for the malware class, the precision (MPr)
and recall (MRe). The CAA is the average of the accu-
racy for each class. We split the data into training and
test sets maintaining temporal ordering (the instances
in the training set were observed before the instances
in the test set). The temporal ordering allows for a
test of how well the models handle concept drift. The
distributions for the goodware and malware are shown
in the sorted column in Table 1. The distributions in
the distributed column are used in a later experiment
mimicking operational network traffic characteristics.
In current IDSs, the number of false positives can
and often does overwhelm an analyst. The analyst
often has to manually investigate any alerts from the
Number of Samples in Datasets
Goodware
Distributed Sorted
Training 11757 13265
Testing 4728 3220
Malware
Training 11091 9092
Testing 45 2044
Table 1: The data distributions used in the distributed
(down-sampled) and sorted data sets. Both of these
sets preserve temporal ordering between the training
and test sets.
Alg Acc CAA MPr MRe
Hist+RF 95.3 94.7 0.953 0.926
CNN 94.0 93.2 0.946 0.896
LSTM 91.3 90.0 0.926 0.843
CNN+LSTM 94.5 93.7 0.956 0.901
LSM 90.7 89.8 0.856 0.856
Ensemble 95.3 95.5 0.962 0.917
Table 2: The accuracy (ACC), class averaged accuracy
(CAA), malware precision (MPr) and malware recall
(MRe) on sequence lengths of 1000. The highest value
for each metric is bolded.
IDS to understand if a compromise has occured. Thus,
reducing the number of false positives by an order of
magnitude significantly reduces the work load for an
analyst. Also, intrusion detection requires high recall
as only one vulnerability needs to be exploited for an
adversary to accomplish his or her objective. Thus, the
requirements for malware detection reach far beyond
classification accuracy.
6 Experimental Results
The results for examining the first 1000 systems calls are
shown in Table 2 with the highest performing methods
highlighted in bold for each metric. Each method
is able to distinguish between malware and goodware
with 90% CAA or greater. Overall, the Hist+RF
achieves the highest measures and is comparable to
using a voting ensemble of all the methods (including
Hist+RF). This result is surprising as we anticipated
that the sequence learning methods would outperform
a histogram representation of the data. We provide a
further analysis of this result in Section 7.1.
The results are statistically significant using
Cochran’s Q test—a non-parametric test for measuring
the differences between three or more measurements.
Hist+ CNN+
RF CNN LSTM LSTM LSM
Ensemble YES YES YES YES YES
Hist+RF - NO YES NO NO
CNN NO - YES NO NO
LSTM YES YES - YES NO
CNN+LSTM NO NO YES - YES
LSM NO NO NO YES -
Table 3: Pair-wise comparison of the investigated al-
gorithms for statistical significance using the McNemar
test with an alpha-value of 0.05 and Sˇida´k correction.
(The null hypothesis is that there is no difference be-
tween classifier outputs.) With the null hypothesis re-
jected, we test the significance between pairs of algo-
rithms using the pairwise Cochran’s Q test—equivalent
to McNemar’s test—and use the Sˇida´k correction to
control for the family-wise error rate.
Table 3 shows which pairs of algorithms are differ-
ent with statistical significance. With an alpha value of
0.05, the ensemble is statistically significantly different
from all of the other methods. Despite the Hist+RF
achieving higher accuracy, it is only significantly differ-
ent from the LSTM. Interestingly, the LSTM is signifi-
cantly different from all of the other algorithms except
the LSM. This may be due to the neurons in both algo-
rithms maintaining temporal state. The CNN+LSTM
is significantly different from the LSTM and LSM. This
gives some insight into the power of the input repre-
sentation from the convolutional layer in CNNs and
CNN+LSTMs.
The success of CNNs on system call log classifi-
cation was surprising given that there is no identifi-
able, quantitative relationship between neighboring sys-
tem call IDs as there is with image pixels, for exam-
ple. Nonetheless, repeated, local, discriminative pat-
terns exist in the log files that the CNNs are able to
learn. The poorer performance of networks consist-
ing only of LSTM layers may be due to the embed-
ding used and/or inadequate training data to learn the
temporal patterns necessary for good classification. For
high-performing object recognition in images, state-of-
the-art models use data augmentation where there are
instances of the same object with different aspects in-
cluding lighting, scales, and orientations.
For sequence data, the problem can be compounded
by a separation in time or the re-ordering of important
sequence structures. It is possible that some types of
malware and goodware did not have a rich enough rep-
resentation in the training set for the LSTMs to ade-
quately learn to recognize them. Data augmentation,
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Figure 2: The CAA over different lengths of the system
call traces varying between 100 and 5000.
which we did not do, is often a necessary element to
creating a high-performance pattern recognizer. Data
augmentation is difficult and can be especially difficult
with cyber data since exact values can be important
and should not be perturbed by random noise. An ideal
situation would be to know the sequence patterns that
discriminate between malware and goodware and to sur-
round those patterns with various types of background
data and separate them by random lengths of time.
Overall performance of the CNNs hint at a poten-
tially larger feature space than the dimensions of the se-
lected kernel for the CNN. The best CNN performance
resulted from a hybrid network with five layers, down-
sampling, and normalization between each layer. This
strategy provides some amount of resistance to noise
while allowing the CNN to detect features over longer
sequences. This also seems to align with the perfor-
mance of Hist+RFs.
The high performance of RFs was surprising. RFs
are a simpler approach for classification and are easier
to train and maintain than neural techniques. All
approaches perform well, however, and could be used
in a variety of domains based on specific domain needs.
6.1 System Call Length We examined how the
sequence length affects the overall performance. The
CAAs for each algorithm are shown in Figure 2. With
only 100 system calls, the LSM has the highest CAA
at 90%. The CAA for the LSM stays around 90%
regardless of the sequence length.. The CAAs for the
other methods increase as the number of system calls
increases up to a length of 1000. The fact that the LSM
is able to achieve high CAA with only 100 system calls
may be due to the signal averaging out as the number
of system calls increases. It is also interesting that with
Alg Data CAA Acc MPr MRe
Hist+RF
Sort 95.3 94.7 0.953 0.926
CV 96.3 96.0 0.965 0.942
Dist 95.9 97.3 0.187 1.000
CNN
Sort 94.0 93.2 0.946 0.896
CV 95.5 95.1 0.959 0.928
Dist 97.0 98.5 0.242 1.000
LSTM
Sort 91.3 90.0 0.926 0.843
CV 90.9 90.0 0.850 0.919
Dist 92.4 94.0 0.107 0.956
CNN+LSTM
Sort 94.5 93.7 0.956 0.901
CV 94.8 94.2 0.955 0.914
Dist 95.0 96.4 0.157 0.978
LSM
Sort 90.7 89.8 0.856 0.856
CV 93.1 92.6 0.926 0.901
Dist 91.3 95.6 0.098 1.000
Table 4: A comparison of results from diffenent evalua-
tions of each algorithm: a) sorted data set with roughly
balanced goodware to malware ratio, b) 10-fold cross-
validation, and c) a test set with significant class skew.
only 100 system calls, malware can be identified with
high accuracy.
Including more than 1000 system calls does not
provide a significant improvement in CAA. Thus, we
can surmise that sufficient information is provided in the
first portion of an executable for differentiating between
goodware and malware.
6.2 Generalizing the Results to Real-World
Scenarios Up to this point, the examined data set
is temporally structured, but it contains a fairly bal-
anced distribution of goodware to malware in the test
set. While this allows for an evaluation of a broad spec-
trum of malware samples, it is not representative of the
distribution of malware found in operational networks
where the ratio of malware to goodware is much lower.
To address this, we also created a data set with a skewed
data set as shown in Table 1 in the distributed column
(a random down-select).
In typical operational situations, ML algorithms are
first evaluated on a training set—often balanced as done
here as class skew has been shown to exacerbate the
effects of other characteristics causing misclassifications
[21]. A common approach for evaluating approaches is
to use n-fold cross-validation. However, this can provide
an overly optimistic evaluation of the performance as
temporal ordering is removed. Deploying to a different
distribution than what was used for testing can result
in significantly different performance.
Table 4 shows the results of evaluating the inves-
tigated algorithms using the sorted data set that we
have been examining, 10-fold cross-validation, and a
distributed data set with significant class skew in the
test set as might be observed in an operational network.
Generally, cross-validation achieves better metrics than
the sorted data set. The cross validation results do
not take concept drift into account in the performance
metric as the temporal ordering is not preserved. This
shows that concept drift is an important aspect to take
into account when developing models for malware de-
tection. Also, if using cross-validation, the same per-
formance levels should not be expected in operational
settings.
For the distributed data set, the CAA is often
similar to the cross-validation and the sorted data set
but precision and recall on the malware is significantly
different—recall is close to 1 and precision is very low.
The low precision is due to the fact that the ratio
of malware to goodware is lower in the distributed
scenario. In our case, we have 45 malware and 4728
goodware samples. If only 3% of the goodware is
misclassified, then 142 samples are misclassified and the
malware precision is 24%. For the sorted scenario with
more malware samples, the malware precision changes
to almost 95%. Thus, the effect of class skew alone has
dramatic affects on the results despite achieving good
results from cross-validation and using the sorted data
set.
7 Discussion and Further Analysis
7.1 Feature Representation Our results have
shown that ML is a viable option for identifying mal-
ware from system call traces. We had hypothesized
that the more sophisticated sequence learning methods
would outperform the Hist+RFs. To further investigate
why the Hist+RF perform as well as it does, we test
whether using a RF and/or representing the data with
histograms has a significant affect on the results. While
the Hist+RF was not statistically significant when com-
pared to the other neural algorithms (other than the
LSTM) it has a much lower training complexity than
the neural methods.
To investigate if the RF caused the high accuracy,
we took the output from the neural methods before
they are fed into the last layer and used them as input
to a RF. This tests whether the RF provides more
discriminatory power than the linear classifier found
at the last layer in a neural network. It also provides
insight into whether the deep learning methods are able
to automatically extract higher-order features from the
system call traces as has been shown in other domains.
The results for using the output from the last layer
of the neural methods as input to a RF are shown in
Output rep RF Non-RF
CNN 93.1 94.0
CNN+LSTM 93.7 94.5
LSM 89.5 90.7
Table 5: The CAA for a RF trained on the outputs
before the output layer for neural methods. The right
column gives the original CAA for the algorithm.
Table 5. The RF column represents using the output
from the neural models as the features input to a RF.
The Non-RF column refers to using the original classifier
of the algorithm (linear classifier). The results show
that the CAAs decreases when a RF is used as the
classifier, although only by about 1%.
We also test whether the histograms were able to
achieve better results using a linear classifier. Using
the histograms as input to a linear classifier results in a
decrease of 10% CAA from 95.3% to 85.0%.
While the system call sequences describe the be-
havior of an executable, there are several methods for
achieving the same functionality in an executable. Mal-
ware authors take full advantage of that fact to ob-
fuscate the behavior of their code including adding
spurious system calls and changing the order of the
system calls. This makes it difficult when trying to
learn using the sequence of system calls. The space
of system call sequences is very large, yet the valid
sequences of system calls (sequences that execute a
valid process) are sparsely distributed throughout the
space—especially those for doing malware. The space is
not continuous, making it difficult for gradient-descent
based optimization-based methods to generalize. Given
more data and a variety, the sequence learners may have
been able to produce better results. These constraints
may have played into why Hist+RF performed as well
as it did.
7.2 Characterizing Malware In addition to iden-
tifying, it is important to also understand what the
malware is doing and why it is classified as malware.
There are several methods to explain what the model
has learned from techniques such as feature importance
and explainability.
The Gini importance value measures the impor-
tance of each feature from an induced RF [5]. We
use the implementation provided in the Python pack-
age scikit-learn [15]. The 20 most important features
(system calls) using the RF with histograms are shown
in Table 6. The Goodware and Malware columns rep-
resent if the system call was of also one of the 20 most
frequently called system call relative to the other class.
Feature Goodware Malware
NtAllocateVirtualMemory X
NtClose X
NtCreateEvent - -
NtCreateFile X
NtCreateSection - -
NtFreeVirtualMemory X
NtFsControlFile X
NtMapViewOfSection X
NtOpenKey X
NtOpenSection X
NtQueryAttributesFile - -
NtQueryInformationFile X
NtQueryInformationProcess X
NtQueryInformationToken X
NtQuerySection X
NtQuerySystemInformation X
NtQueryValueKey X
NtReadFile X
NtRequestWaitReplyPort X
NtSetInformationFile X
Table 6: The most importance features using the Gini
importance values in Hist+RF. The Goodware and
Malware columns represent whether a system call was
more likely to be called by goodware or malware.
The most discriminating system calls deal with file
IO and virtual memory allocation. Malware issues NtF-
sControlFile system calls more frequently than good-
ware. This system call “sends a control code directly to
a specified file system or file system filter driver, caus-
ing the corresponding driver to perform the specified
action” [1]. Thus, we can see that, in general, malware
may try to be more specific with which resources it is
using. Incorporating the parameters sent with system
calls would provide more details about its behavior.
The Gini feature importance measure provides a
global overview of the characteristics of malware and
goodware. We also examine the important features
for each individual prediction using Local Interpretable
Model-Agnostic Explanations (LIME) [18]. The top 15
averaged feature importance from LIME for correctly
identified malware and misclassified malware are shown
in Figure 3a and 3b, respectively. The green bars to the
left are feature importance values for malware and the
red bars to the right are feature importance values for
goodware. The standard deviation error bars indicate
how much variance there is when calculating the mean.
Several of the features overlap with those found by
analyzing global feature importance.
The LIME explanations for the first three features
are the same for the correctly classified and misclassified
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Figure 3: The most important features on average with standard deviation error bars using LIME for a) correctly
classified malware samples and b) misclassified malware samples. The length of the bar represents how influential
it is for goodware or malware. Green and to the left for malware and red and to the right for goodware.
if NtSetInformationFile <= 0.005,
if NtSetInformationFile <= 0.003,
if NtReadFile <= 0.315,
if NtDuplicateObject <= 0.004,
if NtCreateSymbolicLinkObject <= 0.001,
class=malware, [ 7. 2329.]
Figure 4: Example rule from an induced decision tree.
malware samples with little variance. The explanations
diverge starting with the fourth and fifth features, again,
with little variance for correctly classified and misclas-
sified samples. This is important to note because the
fourth and fifth features for the misclassified malware
indicate that the features change the classification to
goodware. Malware authors could use this information
to better obfuscate their malware while those protecting
networks can use this information to improve their mod-
els. This information could also be used for remediation
purposes. For a given sample, knowing what the mal-
ware was doing that led to it being classified as malware
can provide a starting point for a forensic investigation.
Decision trees (DTs) can be used to create a set
of rules to better understand the structure in the data.
We train a DT on output from the RF and examine the
splits that are induced by the DT. Rules, such as the
rule shown in Figure 4, could be extracted from the DT
and used to supplement other IDSs such as SNORT.
Examining the DT, the first split is on NtSetInfor-
mationFile and the majority of instances with that one
split are malware (2666:176 malware to goodware). Fol-
lowing the tree down further provides finer granularity.
Knowing which system calls or combinations of system
calls have high discriminatory power can be very pow-
erful for defending a system, identifying vulnerabilities,
and mitigating their risk. Using ML models with a
domain expert could help to harden computer systems
against malware.
7.3 Algorithmic Considerations The discussion
thus far has focused on the histogram represenation
of the system calls. Explaining sequences of inputs is
not as well established. In addition, there are algorith-
mic constraints that should be considered when deciding
which algorithms to use.
The neural methods inherently face a computa-
tional bottleneck with the vector-matrix multiply. The
parameter space (number of weights) is extremely large,
especially as the number of neurons increases. In addi-
tion, there is a large hyper-parameter space (e.g. ar-
chitecture of the network, activation functions, momen-
tum, and dropout) that has a significant impact on the
induced model. Hist+RF is relatively simple algorith-
mically compared to the neural methods. The neural
methods also require large amounts of data to learn an
effective model. With only 10,000-13,000 training ex-
amples from a complex space and some with very few
system calls (short sequences), the neural methods were
not able to perform as well. Their could possibly be im-
proved by using unlabeled data for pre-training.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined several ML methods as part
of a dynamic analysis of executables for detecting mal-
ware. Each proved to be a viable solution achieving over
90% CAA. We examined techniques for characterizing
the malware using feature importance and explainabil-
ity techniques. Extending these techniques to data se-
quences could help better characterize malware and how
to mitigate its effects on a system. The results and tech-
niques presented here can serve as a step to improving
security against malware.
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